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ABSTRACT 
This study aims to generate new theoretical and empirical insights into the way states and 
policies shape migration processes in their interaction with other migration determinants 
in receiving and sending countries. More fundamentally, this state of-the-art reveals a still 
limited understanding of the forces driving migration. Although there is consensus that 
macro-contextual economic and political factors and meso-level factors such as networks 
all play ‘some’ role, there is no agreement on their relative weight and mutual interaction. 
To start filling that gap, this paper outlines the contours of a conceptual framework for 
generating improved insights into the ways states and policies shape migration processes 
in their interaction with structural migration determinants in receiving and sending 
countries. First, it argues that the fragmented insights from different disciplinary theories 
can be integrated in one framework through conceptualizing virtually all forms of 
migration as a function of capabilities and aspirations. Second, to increase conceptual 
clarity it distinguishes the preponderant role of states in migration processes from the 
hypothetically more marginal role of specific immigration and emigration policies. 
Subsequently, it hypothesizes four different ‘substitution effects’ which can partly explain 
why polices fail to meet their objectives. This framework will serve as a conceptual guide 
for the determinants of international migration research. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This paper outlines the scientific 
rationale of this project by analysing the 
main gaps in migration policy and 
migration determinants research. It 
outlines the contours of a conceptual 
framework and a set of hypotheses for 
generating improved insights into the 
ways states and policies shape migration 
processes in their interaction with 
structural migration determinants in 
receiving and sending countries, which 
will guide the determinants of 
international migration project. In 
wealthy countries, immigration, in 
particular of low-skilled and culturally 
distinct people from poorer countries, is 
increasingly perceived as a problem in 
need of control. The common – but not 
unproblematic – perception is that 
policy-makers have reacted to this 
pressure by implementing restrictive 
immigration policies and increasing 
border controls (Massey et al. 1998).  
However, the effectiveness of such 
policies has been often contested in the 
face of their oft-supposed failure to 
significantly affect the level of 
immigration and their hypothesized 
unintended, perverse and often 
counterproductive effects such as 
pushing migrants into permanent 
settlement, discouraging return and 
encouraging irregular movements and 
migration through alternative legal or 
geographical channels (Castles 2004b; 
Grütters 2003). However, other scholars 
have argued that, on the whole, state 
policies have been largely effective 
(Brochmann & Hammar 1999; 
Strikwerda 1999), which also seems to be 
partly confirmed by a limited number of 
quantitative studies indicating that 
specific policy interventions can have a 
significant effect on migration flows.  
Despite apparently increasing 
immigration restrictions, the volume of 
South–North migration has only 
increased over the past few decades. But 
does this mean that migration policies 
have failed and that states are generally 
unable to control migration? Not 
necessarily. First of all, we should not 
confuse statistical association with 
causality, which is particularly difficult 
to establish because we generally lack 
counterfactual cases. For instance, one 
might argue that the migration-reducing 
effects of immigration restrictions are 
counterbalanced by the migration-
increasing effects of growing economic 
gaps between sending and receiving 
countries or economic growth in 
receiving countries, or the lifting of exit 
restrictions by origin countries.  
 
 
Hence, sustained or increasing migration 
does not necessarily prove policy 
ineffectiveness – as migration volumes 
might have been higher without 
migration controls. The other way 
around, a decrease in migration does not 
prove the policy successful – although 
politicians are generally eager to make 
such claims – as such a decrease might 
for instance also be the result of 
economic growth or an end of conflict in 
origin countries, or an economic 
recession in destination countries. So, 
finding better methodological 
approaches to establish (multiple) 
causality constitutes the first challenge 
facing research on this issue. 
Besides the huge difficulties involved in 
‘proving’ causality as such, a second 
challenge is to bring more precision in 
research by assessing the relative 
importance of immigration policies 
compared to the effects of other 
migration determinants. After all, it can 
hardly be surprising that most policies 
discouraging or encouraging particular 
manifestations of migration will have 
‘some’ effect. The real question is about 
the relative magnitude of this effect 
compared to macro-contextual migration 
determinants, which will eventually also 
determine the effectiveness and 
efficiency of policies. Although some 
studies assert a statistical relation 
between certain policy measures and 
particular migration flows, the relative 
importance of policy effects compared to 
the effects of other migration 
determinants remains largely unclear.  
It is one thing to find that restrictions on, 
say, lows killed labour migration have a 
significant effect on decreasing inflows, 
but the real question is how large this 
effect is compared to the effect of other 
factors such as economic growth, 
employment, violent political conflict 
and personal freedoms. If the latter 
factors explain most variance in 
migration, one might for instance 
conclude that policies have a certain, but 
also limited effect on overall volumes 
and trends of migration. In other words, 
if most variance in migration is explained 
by structural migration determinants or 
other policies, the margin of manoeuvre 
for migration policies is fundamentally 
limited. 
In addition to finding better ways to 
measure the existence and relative 
magnitude of policy effects, a third, 
related, challenge is to improve insights 
into the very nature and evolution of 
migration policies. There seems to be 
reason to question the general assertion 
that migration policies have become 
more restrictive over the past decades. 
Although this idea is often taken for 
granted, the diverse and multiple nature 
of migration policies raises questions 
about our ability and utility to measure 
‘overall’ levels of restrictiveness, and 
even about the overall assumption that 
policies have become more restrictive.  
While several countries have raised 
barriers for particular categories of 
migrants (for instance, low-skilled 
workers and asylum seekers), not all 
 
 
countries have done so, and immigration 
of other categories has often been 
facilitated. Changes in migration policy 
typically facilitate the entry of particular 
origin groups while simultaneously 
restricting the entry of other groups. For 
instance, ‘Fortress Europe’ may be an 
adequate metaphor to characterize 
policies towards asylum seekers and 
refugees (Hatton 2004), but seems 
inappropriate to characterize the 
immigration policies of EU or OECD 
countries as a whole. 
Another example is the US Immigration 
and Nationality Act of 1965, which 
‘equalized’ immigration policies by 
ending positive discrimination of 
European immigrants and contributing to 
increasing non-European migration. This 
also reveals the strong Eurocentric bias 
underlying common views that migration 
to the USA, Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand was largely ‘free’ until at least 
the mid twentieth century (Hatton & 
Williamson 1998) – it may have been 
relatively free for Europeans, but this 
was certainly not the case for Asians or 
Africans, for whom recent reforms have 
meant a liberalization. Also countries’ 
membership and accession to regional 
blocks such as the European Union 
typically coincides with liberalization of 
migration of citizens of member states, 
while immigration restrictions for ‘third-
country’ nationals are sustained or 
further tightened (Mannan & Krueger 
1996).  
Because migration policies typically 
consist of a ‘mixed bag’ of various 
measures targeting particular groups of 
immigrants, there is a considerable risk 
of over-generalizing. While migration 
policies are likely to affect patterns of 
migration selectivity, the impact on the 
overall magnitude of migration flows is 
more uncertain as these are strongly 
affected by other macro-structural 
factors, while migrants’ agency and 
strategies tend to create meso-level 
structures which facilitate migration over 
formally closed borders. Since state 
policies simultaneously constrain or 
enable immigration and emigration of 
particular groups along particular 
geographical pathways, states perhaps 
play a more significant role in structuring 
emigration through influencing the 
(initial) composition and spatial patterns 
of migration, rather than in affecting 
overall volumes and long-term trends, 
which, particularly in liberal 
democracies, appear to be primarily 
affected by other, economic, social and 
cultural migration determinants (Mannan 
& Krueger 1998). 
These examples show that any serious 
inquiry into the effect of migration 
policies not only needs to define the 
concept, but also to ‘unpack’ or 
disaggregate ‘migration policies’ into the 
multitude of laws, measures and 
regulations states deploy in their attempts 
to regulate immigration and emigration 
along categories that are based on 
national origin and further characteristics 
such as gender, age, education, 
 
 
occupation and officially defined main 
migration motives. As migration policies 
are typically affected and shaped by 
different, often opposed, interests, 
policies are typically internally 
incoherent, which further emphasizes the 
need to break down policies into the 
specific measures and regulations they 
comprise. 
In addition, conventional views of 
increasing migration policy 
restrictiveness typically ignore 
emigration policies pursued by origin 
states, which are as diverse and multiple 
as immigration policies, but which seem 
to have become less restrictive overall. 
Only a declining number of strong, 
authoritarian states with closed 
economies are willing and capable of 
imposing blanket exit restrictions. 
Paradoxically, while an increasing 
number of, particularly developing, 
countries seem to aspire to regulate 
emigration, their capability to do so is 
fundamentally and increasingly limited 
by legal (human rights), economic and 
political constraints. The ability of 
governments to affect overall 
immigration and emigration levels seems 
to decrease as the level of 
authoritarianism goes down. This also 
reveals the need to look beyond the role 
of migration policies per se and to 
explore the ways in which states affect 
the migration process more generally. 
RESEARCH BACKGROUND 
So, the crucial question remains: how do 
states and policies shape migration 
processes independently of and in their 
interaction with other migration 
determinants in receiving and sending 
countries? Due to serious methodological 
and theoretical flaws, scholarly research 
has so far hardly been able to produce 
convincing answers to these questions, 
and the second and third questions in 
particular. The inconclusive nature of 
this debate reveals an overall lack of 
conceptual, analytical and empirical 
rigour in the study of migration policy 
effects. Most existing evidence is 
descriptive, biased and partial, which is 
related to the weak embedding of 
migration policies research into general 
theories on the causes of migration. 
In this context, it is important to 
emphasize that the limited of capacity of 
research to answer these key questions is 
not exclusively linked to limitations of 
data and statistical models, but also to the 
rather weak theoretical foundations of 
‘push-pull’ or gravity models which are 
routinely, but uncritically, used for 
studying migration determinants. For the 
very reason that they are often not 
grounded in migration theory, they tend 
to ignore or fail to properly specify 
several theoretically important migration 
determinants in receiving and, 
particularly, sending countries. Even 
with ideal data, statistical analyses will 
not lead to compelling evidence if 
theoretically relevant migration 
determinants are omitted in empirical 
models, or if models are based on the 
 
 
short term or only focus on one particular 
migration flow. This makes it impossible 
to study possible knock-on effects or 
what I have dubbed ‘substitution effects’ 
of one particular measure through the 
diversion of migration flows to other 
geographical, legal or illegal channels. 
In order to improve insights into the role 
of states and policies in migration 
processes, there is a need to embed the 
systematic analysis of policy effects into 
a comprehensive analytical framework of 
the sending- and receiving-country 
factors driving international migration. 
Although there is consensus that macro-
contextual economic and political factors 
and meso-level factors such as networks 
all play ‘some’ role, there is no 
agreement on their relative weight and 
mutual interaction. How do migration 
policies precisely affect migration if we 
control for the many other factors that 
drive international migration? Or, to turn 
the question around: how do macro-level 
processes such as ‘development’, 
economic growth, demographic change, 
education, democratization and conflict 
in origin and destination countries affect 
migration independently from policy 
interventions? In other words, what are 
the constraints and relative margins 
within which migration policies can have 
an effect? 
Why has research on this issue hardly 
advanced over the past decades? A first 
problem is the rather weak connection 
between studies on migration policies 
and migration determinants on the one 
hand and fundamental research and 
theories on the causes of migration on the 
other. A second problem is that 
fundamental theoretical research on the 
nature and causes of migration processes 
has made relatively little progress over 
the last few decades (Arango 2000; 
Massey et al. 1998). There is a plethora 
of research on the social, cultural and 
economic impacts of migration on 
sending and, particularly, receiving 
societies.  
In comparison, and with the possible 
exception of research on migration 
networks, there has been much less 
theoretically driven research on the 
nature and causes of migration processes 
themselves. This particularly applies to 
the study of the precise role of policies 
and states in migration processes. Other 
factors obstructing advances in research 
on migration determinants are data 
problems and unproductive divisions 
between, particularly economic and non-
economic, social science disciplines as 
well as qualitative and quantitative 
approaches. 
To start filling these research gaps, in this 
paper I aim to outline the contours of a 
theoretical and empirical research agenda 
for generating improved insights into the 
ways states and policies shape migration 
processes independently from and in 
their interaction with other migration 
determinants in receiving and sending 
countries. First, I will review existing, 
often disciplinary, theories on migration 
and I will argue how their fragmented 
 
 
insights can be integrated in one 
framework through conceptualizing 
virtually all manifestations of migration 
as a function of capabilities and 
aspirations to migrate. Second, I will 
argue that considerable conceptual 
confusion can be removed if we 
distinguish the preponderant role of 
states in migration processes from the 
hypothetically more marginal role of 
specific immigration and emigration 
policies. Subsequently, based on a brief 
theorization of the role of states and 
policies in migration I will hypothesize 
four different ‘substitution effects’ 
explaining migration policy failure, 
which can guide further research on 
migration determinants within and 
outside the context of the determinants of 
international migration project. 
THEORIES OF MIGRATION 
The preceding analysis has indicated that 
a robust analysis of the role of states and 
policies in migration processes is 
conditional on its sound embedding 
within a more general theoretical 
framework on the determinants of 
migration processes. Although there is a 
quantitative, generally econometrically 
oriented literature on migration 
determinants including some studies on 
the effect of policies, the literature is 
generally characterized by a conspicuous 
ignorance of insights from recent 
migration theories. Hence, migration 
determinants research is generally based 
on obsolete, theoretically void ‘push-
pull’ and gravity models. 
Implicitly or explicitly, gravity and push-
pull models are rooted into functionalist 
social theory. Functionalist social theory 
tends to see society as a system – or an 
aggregate of interdependent parts, with a 
tendency towards equilibrium. This 
perspective, in which people are 
expected to move from low-income to 
high-income areas, has remained 
dominant in migration studies since 
Ravenstein (1885; 1889) formulated his 
laws of migration. The idea that 
migration is a function of spatial 
disequilibria constitutes the cornerstone 
assumption of so-called ‘push-pull’ 
models which still dominate much 
gravitybased migration modelling as well 
as common-sensical and non-specialist 
academic thinking about migration.  
Push-pull models usually identify 
various economic, environmental, and 
demographic factors which are assumed 
to push migrants out of places of origin 
and lure them into destination places. 
While deeply rooted in functionalist, 
equilibrium thinking, it is difficult to 
classify push-pull models a theory 
because they tend merely to specify a 
rather ambiguous list of factors that play 
‘a’ role in migration. Push-pull models 
tend to be static and tend to portray 
migrants as ‘passive pawns’ lacking any 
agency which can perhaps be defined as 
the ability of people to make independent 
choices – to act or not act in specific ways 
– and, crucially, to alter structure and fail 
to conceptualize migration as a process. 
 
 
Neo-classical migration theory is the best 
known and most sophisticated 
application of the functionalist social 
scientific paradigm in migration studies. 
At the macro-level, neoclassical 
economic theory explains migration by 
geographical differences in the supply 
and demand for labour. At the micro-
level, neo-classical migration theory 
views migrants as individual, rational 
and income-maximizing actors, who 
decide to move on the basis of a cost-
benefit calculation. Assuming free 
choice and full access to information, 
they are expected to go where they can be 
the most productive, that is, where they 
are able to earn the highest wages. 
Todaro (1969) and Harris and Todaro 
(1970) elaborated the basic twosector 
model of rural-to-urban migration, 
explaining migration on the basis of 
‘expected income’ differentials. The 
initial Harris Todaro model for internal 
migration has, with some modifications, 
also been applied to international 
migration (Borjas 1989; Borjas 1990). 
Later modifications of the neo-classical 
model included the costs and risks of 
migration, and conceptualized migration 
as an investment in human capital in 
order to explain migration selectivity 
(Bauer & Zimmermann 1998; Sjaastad 
1962). 
Neo-classical and other equilibrium 
migration models largely explain 
migration by geographical differences in 
incomes and wage levels (Harris and 
Todaro 1970; Lee 1966; Todaro 1969). 
Although it would be hard to deny that 
economic differentials play a major role 
in driving migration processes, this 
almost sounds more like a truism or 
assumption than a theory. Furthermore, 
this basic insight alone is insufficient to 
explain the strongly patterned, non-
random nature of real-life migration 
processes. For instance, these models 
have difficulties explaining return 
migration, migration in the absence of 
wage differentials and, particularly, 
adequately grasping the role of states, 
networks and other institutions in 
structuring migration. They also largely 
ignore non-economic migration drivers 
and typically fail to explain 
development-driven increases in 
migration. 
NEO-CLASSICAL THEORY 
Other theories of migration reject the 
underlying functionalist assumption of 
conventional neo-classical models that 
migration decisions are based on the 
rational cost-benefit calculation of 
income-maximizing individuals 
operating in well-functioning markets. 
The new economics of labour migration 
(NELM) hypothesizes that migration, 
particularly under conditions of poverty 
and risk, is difficult to explain within a 
neo-classical framework. NELM 
conceptualizes migration as a collective 
household strategy to overcome market 
failures and spread income risks rather 
than a mere response of income-
maximizing individuals to expected 
wage differentials (Stark 1991; Stark & 
Bloom 1985; Taylor 1999). This gives 
 
 
considerable theoretical room to explain 
migration in the absence of significant 
wage differentials. NELM also argues 
that income inequality and relative 
deprivation within sending societies are 
major drivers of migration (Skeldon 
2002; Stark & Taylor 1989). Through 
remittances, migration can also be a 
livelihood strategy used by families and 
households to raise investment capital if 
credit markets fail. Within a broader 
social scientific perspective, it is possible 
to reinterpret NELM as a theory that 
explains migration as an active attempt – 
an act of agency – by social groups to 
overcome structural constraints. An 
important methodological inference of 
these ‘new’ theories is that market 
access, income inequality, relative 
deprivation, and social security are 
important migration determinants, and 
need to be included in empirical models 
if possible. 
NELM-inspired migration theory seems 
particularly relevant for explaining 
migration in developing countries and 
other situations in which migrants face 
considerable constraint and risk, and 
therefore also seems applicable to ‘non-
labour’ forms of migration, such as 
refugee migration. This points to a more 
general weakness of conventional ways 
of classifying migration into distinct 
types and the concomitant tendency to 
develop separate theories for them. This 
is deeply problematic, as these migration 
types reflect legal rather than 
sociological categories. These 
categorizations ignore empirical 
evidence that migration is typically 
driven by a range of contextual factors 
and that individual motivations to 
migrate are often mixed (Mannan & 
Krueger 2002).. This makes strict 
distinctions such as between voluntary 
and forced migration, or between family 
and labour migration, often deeply 
problematic. This seems certainly to be 
the case in the context of restrictive 
immigration policies, in which 
prospective migrants perceived policies 
as opportunity structures within which 
the choice of migration channel is likely 
to be based on relative ease and costs 
rather than on a consideration of which 
category best matches their ‘genuine’ 
migration motives (Mannan & Kozlov 
2001). 
While some would still classify NELM 
as an amended form of neo-classical 
theory, a more profound critique of neo-
classical and push-pull migration 
theories would stress their a-historical 
nature and their failure to conceptualize 
how macro-structural factors such as 
states, policies, labour markets, status 
hierarchies, power inequalities and social 
group formation strongly constrain 
individual choice and explain why most 
migration tends to occur in socially 
selective and geographically strongly 
patterned ways; that is, along well-
defined pathways or corridors between 
particular origins and destinations. 
Conventional economic models usually 
incorporate structural factors as 
additional costs and risks individuals 
face. It certainly does make sense to 
 
 
assume that structural constraints affect 
the cost-benefit calculus and destination 
choice. However, the reduction of such 
factors to individual costs and benefits 
makes such models inherently blind to 
the very structural features of such 
factors, which can only be analysed on 
the group level as they are embedded in 
and reproduced by patterns of relations 
between people. Despite the considerable 
merits of neo-classical approaches, their 
methodological individualism largely 
inhibits them from capturing structural 
factors. 
At a more fundamental level, 
functionalist social theory can been 
criticized for being unable to explain 
growing disequilibria, structural power 
inequalities, social contradictions and the 
role of conflict in social transformation; 
as well as for its inability to 
conceptualize structure and agency. In 
contrast, ‘conflict theory’, the social 
scientific opposite of 
functionalist/equilibrium theory, 
postulates that social and economic 
systems tend to reproduce and reinforce 
structural inequalities and serve the 
interests of the powers that be, and that 
they can only be altered through a radical 
change in power structures through the 
organized (structured) resistance of 
oppressed groups. In other words, social 
transformation does not often come 
smoothly, and often requires collective 
action enabled by rising consciousness 
about one’s perceived oppression and 
one’s ability to overcome such 
oppression by peaceful or violent 
resistance (Collins (1994)). 
Within the general social-scientific 
paradigm of ‘conflict theory’, Marxist, 
dependency, and world systems theory 
tend to see migration as the direct 
outflow of the spread of global capitalism 
and the related marginalization and 
uprooting of rural populations around the 
world who have no choice other than to 
migrate to cities to join the urban 
proletariat. Migration is therefore seen as 
a process that serves the interests of large 
corporations and specific economic 
interest groups and states that are 
strongly lobbied by these interests. These 
approaches can be criticized for being 
overly deductive and deterministic, with 
their concomitant portrayal of 
individuals as passive victims of 
economic macro-forces. In other words, 
individual migrants are hardly attributed 
any agency and, as far as they act, they 
are supposed to make irrational choices. 
In order to explain why people behave in 
ways that go against their own objective, 
material interests, Marxist theory uses 
the concept of false consciousness, which 
can be defined as the ‘failure to recognize 
the instruments of one's oppression or 
exploitation as one’s own creation, as 
when members of an oppressed class 
unwittingly adopt views of the oppressor 
class’. The assumption that all or most 
migrants behave irrationally seems 
equally unrealistic as the full rationality 
and income-maximizing assumptions of 
orthodox neo-classical models. For 
 
 
instance, it would be difficult to reason 
that the choices of refugees or 
unemployed graduates to emigrate are 
not rational to a considerable extent. 
Although few would still agree with the 
more orthodox versions of neo-Marxist 
theory in the face of ample empirical 
evidence pointing to the fact that poor 
people also exert a considerable amount 
of agency, it would also be naïve to deny 
that migration processes are to a 
significant extent determined by 
contextual factors, and that while 
individual choice is certainly not absent, 
it is considerably constrained by 
structural factors –facilitating migration 
of specific social groups along specific 
geographical and legal pathways while 
simultaneously impeding it for many 
others groups and along many other 
pathways. This seems particularly 
important for poor people with limited 
access to resources and markets and 
living in politically repressive 
environments. 
A powerful example of ‘structure’ – 
among several others – that appears to be 
particularly crucial as a migration 
determinant is the segmentation of labour 
markets. Dual labour market theory 
(Piore 1979) argued that international 
migration is mainly driven by pull 
factors, since the segmentation of labour 
markets creates a permanent demand for 
cheap immigrant labour at the bottom, 
‘secondary’ end of the labour market to 
occupy jobs that ‘primary’ workers 
typically shun, primarily because of 
social status and relative deprivation 
motives. The latter exemplifies the deep 
socio-cultural roots of what superficially 
appears to be ‘just’ an economic 
phenomenon (Mannan & Kozlov 1995). 
Although this is a partial theory, that 
ignores sending-side explanations 
altogether and implicitly assumes a 
quasi-unlimited supply of migrant 
workers, its core argument is very 
powerful to explain the remarkable 
persistence of low-skilled migration to 
wealthy countries over the past half 
century as well as the coexistence of 
domestic unemployment and 
immigration: the demand for low-skilled 
migrants is sector-specific and has 
become structurally embedded in labour 
market structures and socio-cultural 
hierarchies. 
In this context, Stephen Castles (2002) 
has argued that ‘it is one of the great 
fictions of our age that the “new 
economy” does not need “-D workers” 
any more’. He argued that industrialized 
counties continue to import unskilled 
labor, and that – in the absence of 
sufficient legal channels for low-skilled 
labour migration – this often takes the 
form of systematic use of irregular 
migrants or asylum seekers, whose very 
lack of rights makes them easy to exploit. 
Although the industries and mines in 
which low-skilled migrants worked have 
declined since the early 1970s, Saskia 
Sassen (1988) has argued that new 
internal and international divisions of 
labour have arisen, particularly in ‘global 
cities’, where the luxury consumption 
 
 
needs of the high-skilled have created 
new labour market demand, particularly 
in the lower skilled services, such as 
cleaning, childcare, restaurant work, 
gardening, but also in garment 
manufacture, construction, garment 
manufacture and food processing 
(Castles 2002). 
Further elaborating upon the work by 
Piore, Castles, Sassen and others, it is 
possible to theorize that, over 
development processes, labour markets 
have grown increasingly complex and 
multi-segmented while the general level 
and degree of specialization in education 
has increased. As the geographical 
expanse of labour markets typically 
increases as education goes up, 
increasing levels and complexity of 
education and labour markets seems to 
drive people to migrate in order to match 
supply and demand. This seems to be one 
of the main reasons why relatively 
wealthy and developed societies are 
inherently more mobile and migratory 
than relatively poor societies. 
Studying and comparing the structure of 
labour markets as well as concomitant 
differences in income inequalities and 
relative deprivation can also help us to 
further understand the occurrence of 
significant migration between regions or 
countries with similar average income 
levels. However, these hypotheses have 
remained largely untested. The 
methodological inference of these 
theoretical insights is that, in order to 
advance our understanding of the 
structural drivers of migration processes, 
there is a need to develop empirical 
approaches to assess the interrelated 
roles of labour market structure, 
education and skill structure, social 
fractionalization and relative deprivation 
in affecting the volume and, particularly, 
the social composition and the 
geographical patterning of migration 
flows. 
This example of labour markets 
exemplifies that, in order to explain real-
world migration patterns, there is a need 
to go beyond gravity or push-pull 
approaches by looking beyond the level 
of ‘national averages’ such as GDP per 
capita and exploring the internal 
structure of societies and economies. 
This can partly be achieved through 
quantitative approaches, particularly 
through developing new indicators that 
capture key structural features such as 
inequality, relative deprivation (Stark 
&Taylor 1991), social security, and 
labour market structure. It goes without 
saying that all these factors are deeply 
affected by policies pursued by states. 
LABOUR MARKET APPROACH 
The weakness of labour market-based 
migration theories is that they focus on 
receiving country demand factors, and 
generally ignore how origin-country 
factors such as labour market structure, 
income levels and inequalities, social 
security, conflict, states and public 
policies, affect migration. At best, labour 
market-focused migration theories 
 
 
assume a quasi-unlimited supply of 
migrant labour, which seems to be 
implicitly based on the naïve notion that 
high population growth, poverty and 
warfare in developing countries ‘push’ 
migrants to leave, thereby virtually 
reducing their agency to zero. This 
notion clearly conflicts with empirical 
and theoretical insights on the intrinsic 
relationship between migration and 
broader processes of development and 
social transformation (Hatton & 
Williamson 1998; Massey 1991; Skeldon 
1997; Zelinsky 1971). The latter insights 
question the ‘unlimited supply 
hypothesis’ and reveal a much more 
complex picture of how development 
processes affect migration and crucially 
undermine the assumptions underpinning 
conventional migration theories. 
For instance, conventional ideas that 
development in origin countries will 
reduce international migration are 
ultimately based on the assumption of 
‘push-pull’ and ‘gravity’ models that 
there is an inversely proportional 
relationship between absolute levels and 
relative differences of wealth on the one 
hand and migration on the other. By 
contrast, another group of theories 
postulate that development leads to 
generally increased levels of immigration 
and emigration. ‘Migration transition 
theory’ hypothesizes that constraints-
loosening and aspirations-increasing 
economic and human development and 
parallel demographic transitions tend to 
have an inverted J-curve or U-curve 
effect on emigration rates (Mannan & 
Kozlov 1997). This hypothesized non-
linearity and the complexity of 
development migration linkages contrast 
with conventional theories and also 
compel us to design different, 
theoretically informed empirical 
approaches away from standard ‘push-
pull’ and gravity models. 
More in general, the receiving-country 
bias of migration research points to the 
importance of advancing our theoretical 
understanding of the origin-country 
determinants of migration processes at 
different levels of aggregation. Social 
security and welfare spending is another 
example of a potentially crucial origin-
country migration determinant. While 
there are several studies on the contested 
and questionable existence of a ‘welfare 
magnet’ effect on migration, this 
discussion is conspicuously biased 
towards destination states or countries, 
while there is reason to believe that 
factors such as social security matter 
equally if not more from an origin-
society perspective. More generally, this 
example also shows the need to fully take 
into account the role of structural and 
institutional factors in origin societies in 
shaping migration processes. 
DETERMINANTS OF MIGRATION 
Conventional migration theories focus on 
how income and wage levels and, to a 
lesser extent, income inequalities affect 
migration processes. Although they 
might differ in their specification, they 
share a focus on economic differentials 
 
 
as the main driver of migration. This 
coincides with a research focus on labour 
migration and near-total separation from 
research on ‘forced’ or refugee 
migration. The implicit suggestion is that 
these different migration categories 
represent fundamentally different 
processes. There are many reasons to 
contest this view. After all, labels such as 
‘labour’, ‘refugee’, ‘family’ or ‘student’ 
migration primarily reflect legal 
categories, which are useful for 
administrative procedures, but are not 
very meaningful categories to help 
understand migration as a social process. 
For instance, the ‘voluntary’/‘forced’ 
migration dichotomy is simplistic 
because it assumes that one category of 
migrants enjoys total freedom and the 
other category has no choice or agency at 
all. 
The legal-bureaucratic categories 
frequently used in social scientific 
research conceal the fact that, on a 
macro-level, migration processes are 
driven by a multitude of economic and 
non-economic factors and that, on a 
micro-level, migrants are motivated by a 
combination of multiple, interconnected 
but analytically distinct social, cultural, 
economic and political factors. For 
instance, economic development is 
positively associated with 
democratization processes (Burkhart & 
Lewis-Beck 1994), and economic 
development and democratization are 
likely to affect migration processes 
simultaneously. It would be naïve to 
assume that refugees are also affected by 
economic and social considerations, 
certainly where destination choice is 
concerned. Likewise, ‘labour migrants’ 
are likely also to weigh personal 
freedoms in their migration decision-
making. And ‘family migrants’ are 
potential workers too. 
These few examples also show the need 
to look beyond specific policies, and to 
consider the nature of states. For 
instance, the position of states both on the 
authoritarianism-democracy and on the 
strong-weak central power continuums 
seems to be an important macro-
structural determinant of migration 
processes, as both positions affect 
aspirations and capabilities to migrate 
and the extent to which states will desire 
and be able to ‘steer’ migration. There is 
also a clear need to differentiate between 
different types of freedoms as they are 
likely to affect migration in different 
ways. 
THEORETICAL ANALYSIS 
The main challenge for advancing 
migration theory is how to synthesize the 
different migration theories developed 
across a range of social science 
disciplines – ranging from economics to 
anthropology. Faced with the daunting 
complexity and diversity of migration 
processes, migration scholars have often 
– and perhaps wearingly – argued that an 
all-encompassing and all-explaining 
theory of migration will never arise (Salt 
1987; Van Amersfoort 1998). 
Unfortunately, this probably sensible 
 
 
observation has coincided with a strong 
tendency to abandon theorizing 
migration altogether. Although 
migration is certainly a complex and 
apparently ‘messy’ process, this goes for 
virtually all social processes. Moreover, 
migration may be complex, but it is 
certainly not a random process. Instead, 
it is a strongly socially structured and 
spatially patterned process, in which 
strong regularities can be discerned. 
More generally, ‘all-comprehensiveness’ 
is not what social theory should be about 
in the first place. Social theory formation 
is precisely about striking a delicate 
balance between the desire to 
acknowledge the intricate complexities 
and the richness of social life on the one 
hand and the scientific need to discern 
underlying regularities, patterns and 
trends on the other. Theory formation is 
exactly about generalizing, which is a 
reductionist process by definition, where 
the exception may well prove the rule. 
Although it is indeed naïve to assume 
that a one-size-fits-all theory explaining 
migration at all places and at all times 
will ever arise, there is undoubtedly more 
room for theorizing on migration 
processes and how they reciprocally 
connect to broader processes of social 
and economic change. 
Much can already be gained from 
developing a more unified social-
scientific perspective on migration, in 
which unproductive disciplinary 
boundaries are broken down. In their 
seminal review of migration theories, 
Massey et al. (1993) rightly argued that 
the different theories on migration are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive. Because 
different disciplines use different jargons 
and methodological tools, they often 
seem irreconcilable, but below the 
surface they often study similar 
processes and causal links. Once 
conceptual confusion is resolved by 
debate, and sufficient openness is created 
to learn from other methodological 
approaches, a lot of the apparent 
contradictions turn out to be rather 
spurious, and cross-fertilization can 
enrich theoretical thinking. For instance, 
the new economics of labour migration 
(NELM), which is one of the major past 
advances in economic migration theory, 
was apparently inspired by research on 
household composition and livelihood 
strategies conducted by anthropologists 
and sociologists (Lucas & Stark 1985). 
Although there are marked differences 
between different theories, disciplines 
and associated research traditions, they 
are not necessarily incompatible, and 
there is considerable room to identify 
more common grounds and to create 
conceptual bridges. 
However, an eclectic ‘combining of 
insights’ cannot solve some more 
fundamental problems, particularly when 
theories have different paradigmatic 
roots. For instance, it seems impossible 
to merge neo-classical and neo-Marxist 
migration theories, because they differ in 
their most fundamental assumptions. For 
similar reasons, theoretical problems 
cannot be solved by simply ‘plugging in’ 
 
 
variables ‘representing’ the different 
theories in the same regression equation, 
as is often the tendency. What is really 
lacking, and what is hindering theoretical 
synthesis, is a more comprehensive and 
convincing ‘behavioural’ framework of 
migration than the current theories offer. 
The only systematically elaborated 
micro-behavioural model of migration is 
neo-classical. Although neo-classical 
migration theory has been much reviled 
for a number of more and less convincing 
reasons, no credible alternative has been 
proposed so far. 
Despite the enormous value of macro-
level theories developed by sociologists, 
geographers and demographers, because 
of their very macro-level nature they 
often lack a ‘behavioural link’ to the 
micro-level. In other words, they do not 
make explicit the behavioural 
assumptions underpinning the macro-
level correlations they assume or 
describe. It would be to commit a 
classical ‘ecological fallacy’ to confound 
macro-level migration determinants with 
individual migration motives – which is 
exactly what the push-pull and non-
expert literature on environmental 
change and migration typically does. 
After all, people do not migrate ‘because 
of’ abstract concepts such as 
demographic transitions, declining 
fertility, ageing, population density, 
environmental degradation or factor 
productivity. For instance, there may 
often be a correlation between 
demographic and migration transitions, 
but this does not make clear why people 
should necessarily migrate under 
conditions of high population growth. 
People will only migrate if they perceive 
better opportunities elsewhere and have 
the capabilities to move. Although this 
assertion implies choice and agency, it 
also shows that this agency is constrained 
by (historically determined) conditions 
which create concrete opportunity 
structures. 
Ultimately, in the social world, 
‘causality’ therefore runs through 
people’s agency, producing outcomes on 
the aggregate level which can perhaps be 
measured through macro indicators. But 
any convincing macro-model should be 
underpinned by a credible micro 
behavioural link. The lack of micro-
behavioural foundation makes most 
macro-theories deterministic. In fact, the 
problem with the very term 
‘determinants’ is that it conveys a 
somehow deterministic picture of 
‘causation from outside’, independent 
from migrants’ agency and internal 
migration dynamics. It seems therefore 
desirable to (re)define the concept of 
‘determinants’ so as to include human 
agency, which has independent power to 
change social structures (Mannan & 
Krueger 2000). 
Crucially, most macro-theories ignore 
agency. At the same time, neo-classical 
migration theory has a reductionist, 
mechanistic concept of agency. Hence, 
what we need is a new and more realistic 
micro-level model or framework of 
migration. Such a framework should take 
 
 
into account empirical insights of 
decades of migration research from 
across a range of disciplines, but at the 
same time it should remain basic and 
parsimonious enough so as to fulfil its 
generalizing ambitions. Such a 
framework should specify the basic 
assumptions about the factors that make 
people decide to migrate (or not). Two 
further conditions need to be met: first, 
such a model should incorporate a sense 
of agency, and should not conceive 
migration as an almost ‘mechanistic’ 
response to a range of ‘pushes’ or ‘pulls’, 
or wage differentials. Ultimately, this is 
also the reason why gravity models 
normally used for trade cannot be 
assumed to be valid to model human 
migration. People are not goods. Goods 
are passive. People are humans, who 
make active decisions based on their 
subjective aspirations and preferences, so 
their behaviour is not just a function of 
macrolevel disequilibria, neither does 
their behaviour necessarily decrease 
these disequilibria (Mannan & Kozlov 
1999). Second, such a micro-model 
should incorporate a sense of structure, in 
the sense that migration behaviour is 
constrained by structurally determined 
resource and information limitations. 
This above analysis leads to the 
proposition that, in order to improve our 
insights into the factors driving 
migration, and to synthesize prior 
theories, an improved theoretical model 
of migration should: conceive migration 
aspirations as a function of spatial 
opportunity differentials and people’s 
life aspirations; and conceive migration 
propensities as a function of their 
aspirations and capabilities to migrate. 
These two basic assumptions about 
migration behaviour can serve as basic 
building blocks to build a theory of 
migration which synthesizes many 
existing theoretical and empirical 
insights. Although this still needs 
considerable theoretical elaboration in 
future work, such a conceptualization 
would allow us to: integrate economic 
and non-economic theories on migration 
and overcome ‘migration category’-
based theorizing; integrate theories on 
so-called ‘voluntary’ and ‘forced’ 
migration; link micro- to macro-theories; 
and open new avenues for integrating 
agency and culture into migration theory. 
The conceptualization of migration as a 
function of opportunity rather than 
income or wage differentials compels us 
to study how social, economic and 
political conditions affect migration 
processes simultaneously. Improved 
empirical models should reflect this and 
would allow for the study of the relative 
importance of each of such factors as 
well as their mutual interaction. In an 
attempt to move beyond the artificial 
separation between economic and non-
economic explanations, it seems useful to 
apply Amartya Sen’s (1999) capabilities 
approach to migration theory. In his book 
Development as Freedom, Sen (1999) 
defined development as the process of 
expanding the substantive freedoms that 
people enjoy. In order to operationalize 
these ‘freedoms’, he used the concept of 
 
 
human capability, which refers to the 
ability of human beings to lead lives they 
have reason to value, and to enhance the 
substantive choices they have (Sen 1997: 
1959). Sen stressed that freedom is 
central to the process of development 
primarily for its intrinsic, wellbeing-
enhancing power, which has to be clearly 
distinguished from the instrumental 
effectiveness of freedoms of in 
contributing to economic progress, 
which have been the usual benchmark to 
‘measure’ development. 
Within this capabilities perspective, this 
study conceive human mobility as an 
integral part of human development for 
both intrinsic and instrumental reasons. 
First, people can only move if they have 
the capabilities to do so. Human mobility 
can be defined as the capability to decide 
where to live – and migration is the 
associated functioning. Expansions in 
this capability are an expansion of the 
choices open to an individual and 
therefore of their freedom. This is the 
intrinsic argument why mobility can be 
an integral part of human development. 
At the same time, movement can enable 
people to improve other dimensions 
relevant to their capabilities such as their 
income, their health, the education of 
themselves and of their children, and 
their self-respect. This is the instrumental 
value of mobility for development.  
This is why it is important to distinguish 
between the capability to move and the 
act of movement. In fact, some 
manifestations of migration are a result 
of the choices and freedoms of 
individuals becoming more restricted. 
So, enhanced mobility is not only the 
freedom to move – it is also the freedom 
to stay in one’s preferred location. 
Having choice to stay or to go, and where 
to go, captures the very essence of 
agency. The application of a capabilities-
focused conceptualization of 
development (Sen 1999) also creates 
conceptual room to fully include factors 
such as education, health, social security, 
various inequalities, and personal and 
political freedoms as migration 
determinants. It also creates room to 
broaden our view of freedom- and 
wellbeing-generating resources to 
include not only economic, but also 
human and social resources or ‘capitals’. 
Another conceptual advantage of Sen’s 
perspective is that the notion of 
capabilities creates analytical room to 
start incorporating notions of agency in 
migration theory. The concept of agency 
is intrinsically linked to the power of 
social actors to affect processes of 
structural change. It is important to 
emphasize that agency can both sustain 
as well as alter processes and structural 
conditions (Emirbayer & Mische 1998). 
From this, migration itself can be 
conceptualized as a form, or expression 
of, agency, and not only a ‘functionalist’ 
response to spatial differentials in 
economic opportunity. However, the 
extent to which social actors can exert 
agency is dependent on structural 
conditions which determine the space of 
manoeuvre within which individuals can 
 
 
make independent choices. Within the 
capabilities framework, the act of 
migration itself can be wellbeing-
enhancing for the intrinsic value of the 
migration experience. Crucially, this 
enables us to incorporate manifestations 
of migration and mobility, where the 
experience itself is an important motive 
for moving, and the improvement of 
material circumstances plays a relatively 
minor role. As with tourism, through 
discovering new horizons and 
acquainting oneself with other cultures, 
in particular for young people, migration 
can have an intrinsic wellbeing-
enhancing dimension. 
As a next conceptual step, and drawing 
on Isaiah Berlin’s (1969) concepts of 
negative and positive liberty, we can 
conceptualize capabilities as a function 
of positive and negative freedoms. 
Within Berlin’s perspective, negative 
liberty means the absence of obstacles, 
barriers or constraints. This comes close 
to classical ways of conceiving freedom, 
which are particularly focused on the role 
of states and politics in imposing 
constraints on people’s freedom or even 
being an outright threat to people’s lives. 
This concept of liberty is also the basis 
for the United Nations Refugee 
Protection regime, and international 
human rights organizations. Within this 
perspective, democracy, conflict 
prevention and promoting the rule of law 
are typically seen as ways to promote 
people’s freedoms and to prevent 
‘forced’ migration. 
Berlin’s (1969) concept of positive 
liberty refers to the possibility or the fact 
of acting in such a way as to take control 
of one’s life and realize one’s 
fundamental purposes. This concept 
pertains to the agency of individuals and 
groups to change their life circumstances 
and to escape from disadvantaged 
positions. It is enshrined in international 
human rights8 and notions of 
‘empowerment’ in development theory. 
Positive liberty embodies the notion that 
the absence of external constraint is not a 
sufficient condition for people to 
improve their wellbeing. This is a point 
that Amartya Sen has particularly 
stressed in his development theory. For 
instance, a given state might be formally 
democratic and there might be an 
absence of political persecutions, but 
illiterate and poor people generally lack 
the capabilities and resources to actually 
make use of such liberties. In other 
words, people need access to resources in 
the forms of social, human and material 
capital in order to exert their agency, 
such as the freedom to migrate or not to 
migrate. This reveals a fundamental 
paradox: although relative deprivation of 
freedoms and an awareness of better 
opportunities elsewhere may make 
people aspire to migrate, absolute 
deprivation of either negative or positive 
freedoms, or both, will prevent them 
from exerting such migratory agency. 
So, from a capabilities point of view, the 
very term ‘forced migration’ is somehow 
an oxymoron, as people still need 
capabilities to be able to migrate. While 
 
 
deprivation of negative freedoms is 
likely to motivate people to migrate, they 
need a certain level of empowerment or 
access to positive freedoms in order to 
actually be capable of fleeing towards a 
particular destination. When people are 
deprived of both freedoms, they are 
generally forced to stay where they are. 
In conflict situations, the most deprived 
are typically the ones who are ‘forced to 
stay’. The concept of negative freedom is 
also useful for theorizing the role of 
immigration and emigration policies. 
Restrictive immigration policies can 
decreases people’s ‘negative freedoms’ 
to migrate, and can create situations of 
‘involuntary immobility’, a term aptly 
coined by Carling (2002). Such 
involuntary immobility can also occur 
under restrictive emigration policies.  
However, even under liberal migration 
policies where people may enjoy 
abundant negative freedoms, if they are 
deprived of the basic positive freedoms 
and access to social, human and 
economic resources, they will still be 
unable to migrate, particularly over 
larger distances. All of this helps to 
explain the paradox of why development 
often coincides with increasing levels of 
migration. From this, the author 
hypothesize that most emigration is 
likely to occur when people enjoy a 
maximum of negative freedoms and a 
moderate level of positive freedoms, as 
very high levels of positive freedoms and 
declining spatial opportunity 
differentials would somehow decrease 
their aspirations to migrate. This also 
shows why so-called push-pull theories 
are fundamentally flawed: with the 
exception of extreme situations like 
slavery, people are not goods that can be 
passively moved: they need to move by 
themselves, and a fundamental 
precondition for that to happen is that 
they have the willingness and capabilities 
to do so. 
This brings in the concept of aspirations, 
which is a crucial element of this attempt 
at theoretical synthesis and, particularly, 
the attempt to better incorporate agency 
in migration theory. Conventional 
migration theories either totally disregard 
or have very reductionist notions of 
agency. Although within neoclassical 
and other functionalist migration 
theories, there is room for individual 
decision-making, there is no genuine 
room for agency, because individual 
behaviour is a totally predictable, 
mechanistic outcome of wage and other 
opportunity differentials. The underlying 
assumptions are that people are free from 
constraints, enjoy full access to 
information, and make migration 
decisions with the aim of maximizing 
their utility. These are clearly unrealistic 
assumptions. Although mainstream 
economics and, to a certain extent, 
migration economics have come a long 
way to acknowledge information and 
market imperfections in their theories 
and models, the utility-maximizing 
notion underlying decision-making has 
not been fundamentally challenged. 
 
 
Here, it is important to observe that push-
pull and gravity models as well as 
neoclassical and other functionalist 
migration theories implicitly assume that 
people’s preferences and, hence, 
aspirations are constant across societies 
and over time, and basically boil down to 
individual income maximization. In 
other words, people living in different 
societies, despite the huge variations in 
the amount and type of information and 
social, cultural and economic resources 
they can access, are somehow assumed to 
react in similar fashions to similar 
external stimuli or exogenously defined 
‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors. This is what 
makes functionalist theory inherently 
mechanistic and their micro-models 
totally devoid of any real sense of 
agency, as individual choices are entirely 
predictable and human beings are, 
indeed, conceptualized to be ‘pulled’ and 
‘pushed’ in space like atoms without 
their own will and ability to make 
independent choices and, herewith, affect 
structural change. Functionalist theory 
conceptualizes migration as an 
equilibrium- and system-reinforcing 
process. It therefore leaves no analytical 
room for either structural inequalities 
embedded in social hierarchies or 
migrants exercising agency.  
The crucial problem is that functionalist 
migration theory assumes that overall 
preferences are more or less constant 
across societies and over time. This 
ignores the fact that culture, education 
and access and exposure to particular 
forms of information are likely to have a 
huge impact on people’s notions of the 
good life and, hence, personal life 
aspirations; and their awareness and 
perception of opportunities elsewhere. If 
people do not aspire to other lifestyles 
‘elsewhere’, even if they seem 
‘objectively’ or ‘materially’ better, they 
will not translate this awareness into a 
desire to migrate. In fact, cultural ‘home 
preference’ seems to be a major 
explanation for why most people do not 
migrate. On the other hand, if migration-
as-an-experience is intrinsically seen as 
wellbeing-enhancing, people might even 
voluntary opt for ‘objectively’ less 
favourable circumstances. Nevertheless, 
it seems reasonable to hypothesize that, 
in general, people’s personal life 
aspirations and awareness of 
opportunities elsewhere increase when 
levels of education and access to 
information improve in processes that are 
usually conceived as ‘human 
development’. If this coincides with the 
occurrence of significant differences in 
structurally determined spatial 
opportunity differentials, this is more 
likely to generate aspirations to migrate 
in an attempt to fulfil these life 
aspirations.. 
Altogether, this yields a more 
comprehensive picture of behavioural 
causes of migration beyond the basic 
model of income-maximizing 
individuals reacting to wage 
differentials. Such an amended 
theoretical framework also helps us to re-
conceptualize migration as an intrinsic 
part of processes of human development 
 
 
rather than the ‘outcome’ of development 
failure or a function of income and wage 
differentials or other externally given 
‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors. Conceiving 
migration as a function of capabilities 
and aspirations to migrate also gives us 
better, albeit certainly not perfect, 
conceptual tools to start incorporating 
meaningful notions of agency in 
theoretical models and empirical 
approaches. More in general, the 
simultaneous incorporation of agency 
and structure in migration theories 
remains one of the main challenges for 
advancing migration theory and, hence, 
the specification of more realistic 
empirical approaches.  
A key condition for incorporating 
structure and agency is to connect both 
concepts and to understand their 
dialectics. In this respect, ‘structure’ is 
often erroneously seen as a set of 
constraints, whereas in reality structures 
simultaneously constrain and facilitate 
agency. As we have seen, factors such as 
states and policies, economic and social 
inequalities as well as networks have a 
strong structuring effect on migration, 
which means that they are inclusive for 
some groups and exclusive for others, 
and that they strongly favour migration 
along certain geographical pathways 
while discouraging it along others. This 
typically leads to a rather neat social and 
geographical structuring and clustering 
of migration. 
So, the ensemble of structural conditions 
creates complex opportunity structures, 
endowing different individuals and social 
groups with different sets of negative and 
positive freedoms, which, depending on 
how these constellations affect their 
capabilities and aspirations, may or may 
not make them decide to migrate. In its 
turn, such agency will reciprocally affect 
these initial conditions through feedback 
effects, exemplifying the dialectics of 
structure and agency in migration 
processes. 
ECONOMIC DETERMINANTS 
The challenge to link agency and 
structure is also related to the difficulties 
of linking micro level explanations of 
migration, which focus on how 
individual characteristics, access to 
resources, perceptions and preferences 
shape migration behaviour, to macro-
level level theories which, ultimately, see 
migrants’ behaviour as a rather passive, 
and therefore rather predictable, outcome 
of given opportunity structures. In the 
literature it has been argued that meso-
level theories on the formation of 
networks and migration systems provide 
this vital link (Faist 1997). The migration 
literature has identified various feedback 
mechanisms which explain why, once 
started, migration processes tend to 
become partly self-perpetuating, leading 
to the formation of migrant networks and 
migration systems (Mabogunje 1970; 
Massey 1990; Massey et al. 1998).  
Such feedback loops provide a powerful, 
concrete example of the dialectics 
between agency and structure, as they 
 
 
show how migrants create meso-level 
structures such as networks and the 
‘migration industry’ (Castles 2004a) that 
have a knock-on effect in reinforcing 
migration between particular places and 
countries through counter-flows of ideas 
and information (Mabogunje 1970), as 
well as decreasing the costs and risks of 
migration (Massey et al. 1998), thereby 
actively defying structural constraints 
such as high travel costs and restrictive 
immigration policies. This is a prime 
example of how migrants exert agency 
and are able to change initial structural 
conditions in such a way that they further 
facilitate migration along particular 
pathways. It is also a prime explanation 
of why states often find it difficult to 
control once-started migration processes. 
These notions are crucial for theorizing 
the role of states and policies in 
migration processes. 
However, existing theories on these 
‘internal dynamics’ of migration 
processes are characterized by some 
fundamental weaknesses which I 
reviewed in another paper. First, the 
usual focus on migrant networks 
coincides with a neglect of other 
feedback dynamics that operate through 
the impact of migration on the sending 
and receiving contexts (Mannan & 
Krueger 2004). Migration inevitably 
changes the initial structural conditions 
under which migration takes place in 
sending and receiving communities and 
societies, which, in their turn, 
reciprocally affect people’s aspirations 
and capabilities to migrate. Examples of 
such structural impacts include the 
impact of migration on income inequality 
and relative deprivation in origin 
societies, the migration-facilitating role 
of remittances, and the rise of immigrant-
dominated entrepreneurial sectors in 
destination countries, as well as the 
segmentation of labour markets along 
ethnic lines (Mannan & Kozlov 2003). 
Such processes contribute to the 
formation of migration systems – a set of 
places or countries linked by flows and 
counterflows of people, goods, services, 
and information, which tend to facilitate 
further exchange, including migration, 
between the places (Mannan & Kozlov 
2005; Fawcett 1989; Kritz et al. 1992; 
Mabogunje 1970; Massey et al. 1998). 
Second, the largely circular logic of these 
theories reveals an inability to 
conceptualize which migration-
undermining feedback mechanisms may 
counteract migration-facilitating 
feedback dynamics and which may 
explain the endogenous decline of 
established migration systems. 
Theoretically, this can be explained by 
applying insights from the critical social 
capital literature pioneered by Portes 
(1998) and, in particular, the notion of 
negative social capital, to migration 
theories. Migrants do not necessarily 
help each other, and strong social ties and 
networks can also exclude non-group 
members. One of the methodological 
lessons is that empirical models should 
not just assume that the strength of 
network effects is a function of the size 
of migrant communities, as recent 
 
 
quantitative work tends to do. The 
relative importance of networks in 
facilitating migration crucially depends 
on the relative dependence on social 
capital among migrant communities. 
Moreover, positive network effects tend 
to decline over time. 
THEORIZING  
If anything, the above analysis points to 
the preponderance of structural factors 
such as economic and human 
development, labour market structure, 
social stratification, income inequalities, 
relative deprivation and social security, 
and the role of negative freedoms as well 
as positive freedoms in the form of access 
to material, social and human capital in 
shaping people’s capabilities and 
aspirations to migrate. This compels us to 
ask the following crucial question: within 
this broader whole of big forces and 
structural factors, and migrants’ 
considerable agency to shape and 
consolidate migration pathways and 
networks, what role is still left for 
migration policies pursued by states? Is 
that a comparatively marginal one, or do 
policies still play a key role? 
There is no simple answer to that 
question, first of all because the role of 
states and policies seems to vary 
according to the nature of the states, and 
is also dependent on the phase of 
migration system formation. The answer 
also crucially depends on whether we 
refer to the role of states in general or the 
role of specific migration policies. 
However, based on this theoretical 
framework it is possible to elaborate a 
few hypotheses. These are based on the 
notion that migration policies primarily 
affect negative freedoms in the form of 
the right to leave or enter a national 
territory, but that, primarily through non-
migration policies (such as economic and 
education), states also affect people’s 
positive freedoms. While these factors 
affect people’s capabilities to migrate, 
factors such as repression and poverty 
affect people’s aspirations to migrate. 
First, the power of states to influence 
immigration and, particularly, 
emigration is much higher for repressive, 
authoritarian and centralized states than 
for liberal, democratic and decentralized 
states, which need to take more account 
of democratic processes and fundamental 
human rights. Second, we can 
hypothesize that states and policies often 
play an important role in the initiation of 
international migration, whether in the 
form of recruitment, visa requirements, 
colonialism, military occupation, or 
political repression (Entzinger 1985; 
Massey et al. 1998; Penninx 1982; 
Skeldon 1997). On the other hand, it is 
important to emphasize that this is not 
always the case and that certain policies, 
such as recruitment, can also be an 
attempt to formalize already existing 
flows. 
However, once a certain number of 
migrants have settled at the destination, 
migration can become partly self-
perpetuating (Castles 2004b; Massey 
 
 
1990; Massey et al. 1998). The ‘internal 
dynamics’ of migration processes make 
additional movements more likely 
through various social, cultural and 
economic feedback mechanisms. 
According to migration systems theory 
(Mabogunje 1970), such mechanisms 
lead to almost organized migratory flows 
between particular regions and countries 
(Kritz et al. 1992; Portes & Böröcz 
1987). In particular, migrant networks 
are believed to play a crucial role in 
facilitating continued migration over 
formally closed borders (Böcker 1994), 
which is a key example of how migrants’ 
agency and counter-strategies can 
actively undermine states’ attempts to 
control migration. 
Many migration scholars are therefore 
sceptical about the abilities of liberal 
democratic states to control migration. 
They argue that fluctuations in migration 
primarily respond to structural demand 
factors determined by human 
development, economic cycles, 
employment and changes in the structure 
of segmented labour markets; factors 
which largely lie beyond the reach of 
policy-makers. At the same time, migrant 
networks further facilitate migration 
along established pathways. Hence the 
assertion that ‘borders are largely beyond 
control and little can be done to really cut 
down on immigration’ (Bhagwati 2003). 
Other scholars have countered such 
scepticism by arguing that, on the whole, 
immigration policies have been largely 
effective (Brochmann & Hammar 1999; 
Carling 2002; Strikwerda1999). 
However, this is partly a spurious 
disagreement. Considerable conceptual 
confusion can be reduced by clearly 
distinguishing the preponderant role of 
states in migration processes from the 
comparatively more marginal role of 
specific immigration and emigration 
policies. There can be no doubt that states 
can play an absolutely crucial role in 
shaping and transforming migration 
patterns (Brochmann & Hammar 1999; 
Skeldon 1997; Strikwerda 1999). Over 
the course of modern history, trends and 
patterns of migration have been 
intrinsically linked to processes of state 
formation and decline, economic and 
territorial imperialism and warfare. The 
very notion of international migration 
presumes the existence of national states 
and clearly defined territorial and 
institutional borders. The importance of 
factors such as economic and human 
development, labour markets, education 
and income inequalities points to the 
importance of non-migration policies, 
such as labour market, taxation, social 
welfare and foreign policies in indirectly 
affecting migration processes. From this, 
it is possible to hypothesize that state 
influence is primarily felt through 
general policies rather than migration 
policies per se, as the latter have a limited 
influence on the main determinants of 
migration. 
In the face of the dispute in migration 
research about the effectiveness of 
migration policy, it is important 
minimize conceptual confusion by 
clearly defining what constitutes 
 
 
migration policy and by distinguishing 
policy effectiveness from policy effects. 
Migration policies can be defined as 
laws, rules, measures, and practices 
implemented by national states with the 
stated objective to influence the volume, 
origin and internal composition of 
migration flows. The term 
‘effectiveness’ refers to the extent to 
which policy objectives have been met, 
while the ‘effect’ just refers to the actual 
impact of a particular law, measure or 
regulation. This gives effectiveness a 
strong evaluative dimension. 
IMPACTS OF MIGRATION  
The migration policy literature has 
argued that immigration policies 
frequently fail because they have several 
unintended, often counter-productive 
effects. Within the framework developed 
in this paper, migrants’ agency – in 
particular their creative ability to defy 
immigration rules by adopting new 
migration strategies and pathways – 
plays a key role in explaining such 
unintended effects. However, the 
existence and strength of such ‘perverse’ 
effects is highly contested, and therefore 
requires better empirical testing. It is 
reasonable to assume that migration 
policies, if implemented, must have some 
effect on migration. The crucial 
questions are: which effects, and what is 
the relative importance of these effects 
compared to other migration 
determinants.  
Recent reviews of immigration policies 
lead to the hypothesis that policies are 
more effective in determining the 
selection and composition of migration 
rather than the overall volume and long-
term trends of migration. However, the 
impact of policies on migration volumes 
of the particularly targeted category 
receive most if not all attention, which is 
unfortunate as the effects on other flows 
are crucial in understanding the structural 
and long-term effects of migration 
policies on overall migration flows. 
Based on the above analysis, I 
hypothesize that immigration restrictions 
can potentially lead to four main types of 
substitution effects which can reduce the 
effect of restrictions on inflows in the 
particular, targeted category: 
 Spatial substitution effects may 
occur through the diversion of migration 
to countries with less restrictive 
regulations for similar categories of 
migrants. There is some largely 
descriptive evidence observing such 
spatial substitution effects for asylum, 
family and irregular migration to Europe 
and North America. In the Dutch 
language, such spatial substitution 
effects have also been dubbed as the 
‘waterbed effect’ (Grütters 2003; van der 
Erf 2003). 
 Categorical substitution effects 
may occur due to a reorientation towards 
other legal or illegal channels when entry 
through one particular channel becomes 
more difficult. For instance, it has 
frequently been argued that the lack of 
 
 
immigration channels for low-skilled 
labour migrants has compelled migration 
through family, asylum or student 
migration channels by people who 
basically migrated to work (Harris 2002; 
Massey 2004) and that it has increased 
irregular migration (Castles 2004b). 
 Inter-temporal substitution 
effects or ‘now or never migration’ may 
occur if migration surges in the 
expectation of a future tightening of 
migration regulations. For instance, it has 
been argued that when the Federal 
Republic of Germany tried to discourage 
family reunification in the late 1970s, 
family migration to the Federal Republic 
increased, since many migrants feared 
that, eventually, family reunification 
might be forbidden completely 
(Entzinger 1985). There was a surge in 
Surinamese migration to the Netherlands 
in the 1970s around independence, and a 
surge in West Indian migration before 
1962, when restrictions were introduced 
with the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 
(Peach 1968). Such effects have also 
been described for asylum migration 
(Grütters 2003). After the introduction of 
more restrictions, immigration typically 
shows a sharp fall. The long-term effect 
of such restrictions may thus be limited 
by the premeasure surge in inflows. 
 Reverse flow substitution effects 
occur when immigration restrictions 
decrease return migration flows. Several 
studies have argued that restrictive 
immigration policies discourage return 
migration and therefore push migrants 
into permanent settlement. This 
phenomenon has been described for 
Turkish and Moroccan ‘guest worker’ 
migration to north-west Europe, where 
many temporary workers ended up 
settling after the post 1973 recruitment 
ban (Böcker 1994; Entzinger 1985). If 
migration restrictions decrease inflows 
but simultaneously also decrease return 
flows, their effect on net inflows 
becomes much more ambiguous. 
However, such hypotheses have not been 
subjected to empirical tests. 
Above four hypotheses about the 
unintended effects of policy restrictions 
need to be taken into account when 
measuring the effect of particular 
policies on migration flows. Decreases in 
restrictiveness are likely to have the 
opposite effect, and restrictive 
emigration policies can also have more or 
less similar spatial, categorical, inter-
temporal and reverse flow substitution 
effects. As has been argued above, the 
danger of exclusively focusing on the 
particular inflow targeted by the policy is 
to over-estimate its effect. It is only by 
focusing on the effects of policy on 
overall migration flows through other 
spatial and legal channels and over a 
longer time period that a more 
comprehensive and methodologically 
valid picture can be obtained. 
Additional hypotheses can be elaborated 
on the policy effects of frequently used 
nonrestrictive policy instruments. 
Examples may include the oft-assumed 
‘pull effect’ of legalizations of irregular 
 
 
migrants, which have made such policies 
politically controversial. However, the 
existence of such pull effects has been 
contested based on descriptive 
quantitative analyses, indicating that this 
hypothesis needs proper testing. 
Another example is the effect of labour 
recruitment agreements. It has been 
argued that their effect is much lower 
than often hypothesized (Reniers 1999; 
Shadid 1979), but here also there is an 
absence of adequate, empirical tests. 
Besides measuring the direct effects of 
migration policies on the volume of 
flows within the migration category 
targeted by specific policies, empirical 
analyses within the determinants of 
migration project will focus on testing for 
these various substitution effects in order 
to acquire a more comprehensive 
empirical insight into the effects of 
migration policies. It goes without saying 
that empirical analyses will control for 
other theoretically relevant sending- and 
receiving-country migration 
determinants derived from the 
conceptual framework developed in this 
paper. 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper, the author have argued that 
although the effectiveness of migration 
policies has been widely contested in the 
face of their supposed failure to steer 
immigration and their hypothesized 
counter-productive effects, empirical 
evidence has remained inconclusive as a 
consequence of fundamental 
methodological and conceptual 
limitations. Although the general 
migration policy literature has yielded a 
rich set of hypotheses on possible policy 
effects, empirical evidence is mostly 
descriptive or anecdotal. At the same 
time, the migration determinants 
literature suffers from methodological 
problems and is largely based on obsolete 
and theoretically uninformed push-pull 
and gravity models, and is biased by 
omitting crucial sending-country, non-
economic and policy factors. The 
scholarly analysis of policy effects has 
remained under-theorized, and poorly 
connected to general migration theory. 
Because of this lack of precision and 
specification, it remains unclear how 
migration policies affect migration flows 
when other forces driving international 
migration are taken into account. Most 
empirical models miss out the ‘big 
picture’ by focusing on short-term 
fluctuations on particular migration 
flows and do not take into account the 
impact of policies on overall and long-
term migration patterns and trends. More 
fundamentally, the contested nature of 
this debate reveals a still limited 
understanding of the forces driving 
international migration and the lack of 
theoretically driven research. Although 
there is consensus that macro-contextual 
economic and political factors and meso-
level factors such as networks all play 
‘some’ role, there is no agreement on 
their relative weight and mutual 
interaction. To start filling this gap, this 
paper outlined the contours of a 
 
 
conceptual framework for generating 
improved insights into the ways states 
and policies shape migration processes in 
their interaction with structural migration 
determinants in receiving and sending 
countries. 
This paper tried to argue that the current 
research impasse can only be overcome 
by firmly embedding the multi-method, 
longitudinal empirical analysis of policy 
effects into a more comprehensive 
theoretical framework of the macro and 
meso-level forces driving international 
migration. The author have argued that 
the fragmented insights from different 
disciplinary theories can be integrated in 
one model through conceptualizing 
virtually all manifestations of migration 
as a function of capabilities and 
aspirations to migrate and also proposed 
a set of hypotheses on perverse 
‘substitution effects’ of migration 
policies which can guide future empirical 
research. 
However, the limited ability of prior 
research to assess the role of states and 
policies and migration processes is not 
only linked to theoretical problems, but 
also to concomitant methodological 
problems and important limitations. 
Nevertheless, from this paper it may 
already be clear that, in order to be tested, 
the key hypotheses about potential 
substitution effects require particular 
data and methodological approaches. 
First of all, spatial substitution effects 
can only be studied through ‘double 
comparative’ approaches which 
simultaneously study the migration of 
multiple origin groups to and from 
multiple destination countries. Such 
double comparative analyses require the 
availability of bilateral flow data. Also 
for studying inter-temporal substitution 
effects, a key requirement is the 
availability of bilateral flow data which 
preferably spans several decades. The 
theoretical relevance of reverse flow 
substitution effects reveals the need to 
consider immigration and emigration as 
separate social phenomena which require 
aggregate and, preferably, bilateral 
migration data that differentiate between 
outflows and inflows. The study of 
categorical substitution effects requires 
migration flow data which differentiate 
between the different migrant categories. 
However, it is important to emphasize 
that not all problems can be ‘fixed’ just 
by collecting better data and specifying 
better quantitative models. Ultimately, 
empirical research should be theory- and 
not data-driven, and the point is that 
many theoretically relevant structural 
factors are indeed difficult to quantify. 
There are serious limitations in the 
availability of reliable indicators and it 
would also be naïve to assume that such 
indicators can capture all relevant 
dimensions of such structural features. 
Empirical quantitative models should be 
improved as much as possible. However, 
this cannot solve all problems, and the 
‘non-quantifiability’ of certain factors 
should not be a reason to ignore them. 
 
 
To combine the different strengths of 
quantitative and qualitative approaches, 
methodological triangulation seems to be 
a more promising avenue. Such an 
approach systematically combines 
formal quantitative tests of key indicators 
using panel datasets with detailed case 
studies studying the relation between 
transformations of economic structures 
and labour markets and migration 
patterns for particular countries or 
regional blocks. Such case studies should 
provide an empirically ‘thick’, informed 
description, supplemented, whenever 
possible, with exploratory quantitative 
analysis. This can serve to develop new 
ideas and hypotheses as well as a 
‘plausibility-check’ of results generated 
by formal tests. 
Policy reviews should also include a 
qualitative assessment of the effects and 
effectiveness of these policies, from 
which hypotheses can be derived. 
Because much information on policies 
will be lost through quantification, the 
qualitative review and categorization of 
migration policies has a value in itself, 
and contributes to the improvement of 
the conceptual framework. 
Methodological heterodoxy and true 
interdisciplinary openness are therefore 
central conditions for advancing research 
on migration determinants. Through 
creatively integrating qualitative and 
quantitative approaches, it is possible to 
increase insights into the nature and 
evolution of migration policies and their 
effects on the size, direction, timing and 
composition of migration flows. 
Eventually, such an open, creative and 
flexible approach will enhance our 
ability to create a generalized theoretical 
understanding of the determinants of 
international migration.  
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